KDI Open Access is a program of fully open access journals to facilitate the widest possible dissemination of high-quality research. All research articles published in KDI JEP are immediately, permanently and freely available online for everyone to read, download and share in terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Effects of the Basic Pension Reform on Consumption and Labor Supply of the Elderly†

Author & Article History

*Cho: Ph.D. Student, Department of Economics, Florida State University (E-mail: mc23m@fsu.edu); Son (Corresponding Author): Professor, School of Economics, University of Seoul (E-mail: hlson@uos.ac.kr).

Manuscript received 07 January 2026; revision received 12 January 2026; accepted 02 June 2026.

Abstract

This study examines the effects of South Korea’s Basic Pension reform on the consumption and labor supply of the elderly. Using data from the Korea Welfare Panel Study (KoWePS) spanning the years 2009 to 2018, and by applying the difference-in-differences methodology, we find that the increase in pension benefits has had a small positive effect on household consumption but no significant impact on overall employment. However, we observe a decline in full-time employment and total work hours among the elderly. Additionally, a triple-difference analysis shows that the labor supply reduction is concentrated among low-educated elderly women, highlighting important heterogeneity in policy responses to the pension reform.

Keywords

Basic pension, Non-contributory pension, Consumption, Labor supply, Elderly

JEL Code

D12, H55, J14, J22

I. Introduction

Population aging is a growing global challenge, shifting from a primarily high-income issue to a worldwide phenomenon (Wilmoth et al., 2023).1 A majority of aging populations will reside in low- and middle-income countries (WHO, 2024), where underdeveloped pension systems pose significant risks to the well-being of the elderly (Bloom et al., 2015). Consequently, many governments are increasingly introducing public pension programs to ensure income security and to address the persistent concern of elderly poverty.

South Korea faces this challenge acutely, with one of the highest elderly poverty rates among OECD countries (OECD, 2022). To address this issue, the government introduced the Basic Pension in 2008 – a non-contributory cash transfer targeting the bottom 70% of the elderly – and significantly expanded benefit levels in 2014. This reform creates a unique opportunity to examine the causal effects of expanded old-age cash transfers in a context with a limited safety net for the elderly.

Theoretical models predict that cash transfers reduce the labor supply (Moffitt, 2002; Blau and Robins, 1986; Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999), yet the empirical evidence remains mixed, with some studies finding reduced labor force participation (Fetter and Lockwood, 2018; Ranchhod, 2006; Unnikrishnan and Imai, 2020) and others finding little to no impact (Banerjee et al., 2017; Koh and Yang, 2021; Sung and Lee, 2018).2 These conflicting findings underscore the importance of evaluating how specific pension reforms, particularly those with moderate benefit levels, influence the behavior of the elderly in contexts where the impact on consumption is also uncertain.

Building on this literature, this paper examines the effects of the 2014 expansion of South Korea’s elderly cash transfer program on consumption and the labor supply among the elderly. Using data from the Korea Welfare Panel Study (KoWePS) from 2009 to 2018 and implementing a difference-in-differences design, we find evidence of a modest increase in household consumption. Turning to labor supply, we find no significant impact on the extensive margin, measured by labor force participation and employment, but a significant reduction in full-time employment and hours worked among the employed. A triple-difference strategy (DDD) reveals no heterogeneous effects by socioeconomic status among men, but shows reduced labor force participation and employment among low-educated women. These findings suggest that the expansion of pension benefits may have alleviated financial constraints for this subgroup, allowing them to reduce their labor supply.

Our paper connects to the broader literature on the effects of pensions on consumption and labor supply. The early body of work examines how pension transfers influence consumption. While some studies generally find that old-age pensions increase consumption (Fan, 2010; Chen, 2017; Unnikrishnan and Imai, 2020), magnitudes vary considerably, with more limited consumption responses documented in the Korean context (Koh and Yang, 2021; Ku et al., 2024).3 Our study builds on this literature by examining the effects of Korea’s Basic Pension benefit expansion, which increased transfers to roughly 12% of monthly household income,4 providing new evidence on how a relatively modest but targeted pension affects both consumption and labor supply among the elderly.

This study is also related to the literature examining the effects of cash transfers on the labor supply of the elderly. Studies find sizable reductions in labor force participation across several contexts – approximately 8.4 and 12.6 percentage points for men and women in South Africa (Ranchhod, 2006), 13% lower employment likelihood in India (Unnikrishnan and Imai, 2020), and an 8.5% labor supply decline in the United States (Fetter and Lockwood, 2018) – though the effects vary depending on the generosity of the program, the institutional design, and certain recipient characteristics, such as gender (Kaushal, 2014). We contribute to this strand in the literature by examining the Korean Basic Pension, known for comparatively modest transfers relative to recipients’ incomes. While existing studies consistently document large reductions in labor force participation, we find little evidence of such extensive margin effects. Instead, pension eligibility appears to reduce the labor supply along the intensive margin. This suggests that the degree of program generosity may shape not only the magnitude but also the margin along which labor supply responses occur.

There has been an increase in the number of studies focusing on the effects of the basic pension in South Korea on elderly outcomes, mostly written in Korean (Sung and Lee, 2018; Kim and Kim, 2021; Kim et al., 2022; Jin, 2023; Park et al., 2024). A recurring limitation in most of these cases, however, is that identification typically compares pension recipients to non-recipients within the elderly population. Given that receipt status is related to income and asset levels, such comparisons may reflect underlying differences in economic conditions rather than effects of the pension itself. Many studies also rely on narrow pre- and post-policy windows, limiting pre-trend testing and the detection of longer-run effects. We address these concerns by exploiting the age-based eligibility cutoff for the Basic Pension in a difference-in-differences design using data from 2009 to 2018. Relying on eligibility variation rather than actual receipt mitigates selection bias and yields cleaner causal evidence. We also go beyond extensive margin effects to examine full-time employment and hours worked. Because our estimates reflect intent-to-treat effects based on age eligibility rather than actual receipt, we further examine heterogeneous effects by education level and income group to better approximate treatment effects on actual recipients.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the background and outlines the details of the Basic Pension reform. Section 3 reviews the relevant literature. Section 4 presents the data sources, details the sample construction process, and defines key variables. Section 5 outlines our empirical strategy. Section 6 presents the empirical results on labor supply and consumption. Section 7 summarizes the findings and concludes the paper.

II. Background

South Korea is undergoing one of the fastest demographic transitions toward an aging society. While the OECD average elderly population ratio increased from 12.81% in 2000 to 18.63% in 2024, South Korea’s rose from 7.22% to 19.27%, surpassing the OECD average (World Bank, 2024). The proportion of people aged 65 or older is expected to reach 44% by 2050 (The Lancet Regional Health–Western Pacific, 2023). This demographic shift has been accompanied by persistently high poverty rates among the elderly, averaging 44.08% between 2011 and 2022, a rate among the highest in the OECD for most of these years (OECD, 2022).

FIGURE 1.

POPULATION AGED 65+ (2000–2024)

jep-48-3-25-f001.tif

Note: Population ages 65 and above (% of total population).

Source: World Bank Open Data (2024).

To address these challenges, South Korea introduced the National Pension System (NPS) in 1988, which is a defined benefit system (Lee and Shin, 2024) with initial coverage for workplaces employing ten or more full-time employees (National Pension Service, 2025), requiring at least ten years of contribution (Ministry of Government Legislation, 2024). Due to the gradual roll out to cover smaller workplaces, many older adults at the time had limited opportunities to enroll. Consequently, they reached old age without pension coverage. Early enrollees also tended to have short contribution periods, resulting in inadequate benefits.

In light of the persistent poverty rate among the elderly and the limited coverage of the NPS, the government enacted the Basic Old-Age Pension Act on April 25, 2007, which came into effect on January 1, 2008. The Basic Old-Age Pension is a non-contributory scheme in which the government provides a monthly cash benefit to the bottom 70% of the elderly population. This program aims to promote income security and enhance welfare in old age. However, the Basic Old-Age Pension, which had offered a maximum monthly benefit of 84,000 KRW (US$58),5 was criticized for failing to provide adequate support for the elderly (Lee et al., 2018; Kim and Jung, 2012).

In response, the government implemented a major reform in 2014 to better support low-income older adults (Kang et al., 2022; Kim and Kim, 2021; Lee et al., 2018). The reform significantly raised the maximum monthly benefit from 99,100 KRW (US$68) to 200,000 KRW (US$138) and renamed the program the Basic Pension. As a result, the budget increased significantly from 210 billion KRW (US$145 million) allocated for the Basic Old-Age Pension in the first half of 2014 to 470 billion KRW (US$324 million) for the Basic Pension in the second half of the same year (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2015a; 2015b).

Eligibility for both the Basic Old-Age Pension and Basic Pension was limited to individuals aged 65 or older, with recognized income levels below annually adjusted thresholds.6 Figure 2 presents the eligibility thresholds for households with one eligible elderly member and those with two eligible elderly members. The thresholds are determined each year by the Minister of Health and Welfare based on the amount of the previous year adjusted for the national consumer price inflation rate as published by Statistics Korea.

FIGURE 2.

BASIC PENSION INCOME MONTHLY THRESHOLDS (2011–2025)

jep-48-3-25-f002.tif

Note: The figure displays the annual income threshold used to determine eligibility for the Basic Pension, set by the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW). All monetary values are in Korean won (KRW). US$1 is equal to 1,449 KRW as of February 7, 2025.

Source: Data are based on annual guidelines published by the MOHW.

Table 1 presents the annual changes in the maximum pension benefit7 for single-person households, reflecting the transition from the Basic Old-Age Pension to the Basic Pension scheme. The benefit amount is adjusted annually based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation rate, and it has increased every year except in 2021. To account for differences in living costs between single-person and two-person (typically a couple) households and to avoid overlapping support, the Basic Pension benefit is reduced by 20% for each recipient when both spouses are eligible (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2015b). As a result, households with two eligible elderly members receive a combined benefit equal to 160% of the single eligible elderly household amount. For example, in 2014, eligible individuals in single-person households received 200,000 KRW (US$138) per month, while each eligible individual in a corresponding two-person household received 160,000 KRW (US$110), due to the 20% reduction applied to each recipient, making the combined total 320,000 KRW (US$221).

TABLE 1

CHANGES IN THE MAXIMUM PENSION AMOUNTS

jep-48-3-25-t001.tif

Note: This table reports statutory maximum monthly benefit amounts. All monetary values are in Korean won (KRW). The combined amount for couples is calculated as 160% of the single-person amount, reflecting a 20% reduction per eligible spouse. The maximum benefit of 300,000 KRW was not uniformly applied to all recipients upon its introduction. The government initially extended the 300,000 KRW benefit to recipients in the bottom 20% of the income distribution in April of 2019, expanded it to the bottom 40% in January of 2020, and applied it to all eligible recipients (bottom 70%) starting in January of 2021.

Source: Data for 2008–2020 are reproduced from Kim and Kim (2021); data for 2021–2025 are based on annual guidelines published by the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW).

III. Data

We use data from the Korea Welfare Panel Study (KoWePS) to estimate the causal impact of the Basic Pension program. KoWePS is an annual longitudinal survey that has been conducted jointly by the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs (KIHASA) and Seoul National University annually since 2006. It collects detailed information on household characteristics, income, welfare benefits, and the economically active status of households, making it a valuable dataset for analyzing labor supply decisions and household expenditure patterns and assessing the impact of the Basic Pension. KoWePS also records whether the respondents receive the Basic Pension. Given its focus on welfare, KoWePS utilizes a stratified sampling design that oversamples low-income households. To maintain national representativeness for the elderly population, our analysis incorporates the longitudinal sampling weights provided with the dataset to adjust for this oversampling.

We use the 4th–13th waves (2009–2018) of KoWePS. We begin our sample in 2009 to avoid contamination from the introduction of the Basic Old-Age Pension in 2008. We conclude the sample in 2018 to avoid the subsequent policy shifts in 2019 and 2020, during which benefit amounts began to vary based on the recipient’s income classification. We restrict our analysis to individuals aged between 55 and 74, defining the 55-64 age group as the control group and the 65-74 group as the treatment since age 65 is the eligibility threshold for the Basic Pension.

Our main outcome variables include household expenditure, which is adjusted for inflation, current employment status, labor force participation status, self-employment status (among the employed), full-time work status (among the employed) status, and work hours (among the employed).

Table 2 presents summary statistics, separately for the treatment and control groups in the analysis sample. In terms of household expenditure, the control group spends an average of 3,956,800 KRW (US$2,730), whereas the treatment group spends 2,481,000 KRW (US$1,712). The expenditure measure includes a broader range of expenses, such as housing-related costs (including rent), tax and social security contributions, and various consumption categories (e.g., food, healthcare, education, leisure, and transportation).

TABLE 2

SUMMARY STATISTICS

jep-48-3-25-t002.tif

Note: 1) Only wage workers were asked about their full-time status; 2) Metropolitan region refers to the Seoul Metropolitan Area (Seoul, Incheon, and Gyeonggi-do); 3) All expenditures are presented as 10,000 KRW (US$7).

The labor force participation rate declines from 64% to 37% between the control and treatment groups, with the employment likelihood displaying a similar pattern. The likelihood of being self-employed among the employed is 28% for the control group and 41% for the treatment group. This pattern is consistent with the possibility that older individuals who wish to continue working may face greater difficulty obtaining wage employment and therefore turn to self-employment. In South Korea, limited opportunities for wage employment have been identified as a factor contributing to entry into self-employment (Lee, 2020). Among wage workers, the proportion of full-time workers is 89% for the control group, whereas it is 73% for the treatment group. Work hours are higher for the control group, with weekly work hours being about 38 hours and close to 29 hours for the control and treatment groups, respectively.

We control for additional covariates, including age, gender, household size, education level, marital status, and metropolitan residence. When comparing the proportion of males between the control and treatment groups, the former shows 48% and the latter 45%, consistent with the fact that women typically outlive men. We also control for asset ownership, specifically whether the individual belongs to a household that owns a home and/or a car.

IV. Empirical Strategy

Leveraging the variation in Basic Pension eligibility, where individuals become eligible for the old-age pension program starting from the month they turn 65, we employ the following difference-in-differences design:

Here, Yit is the outcome variable, in this case labor market outcomes and consumption, and Treati is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the individual is aged 65 or older. Postt is a post-pension reform indicator that equals 1 if the year is 2015 or later. Although the Basic Pension reform was enacted in July of 2014, the KoWePS survey is administered annually during the first half of each year. Because the 2014 survey wave was fielded prior to the reform’s implementation, we classify 2014 as belonging to the pre-reform period. Our coefficient of interest is β3, which estimates the effect of the policy change on the outcome variable. The control vector Xit consists of household size, age, educational background, marital status, metropolitan residence status, and house and car ownership status. Individual fixed effects θi are included to capture individual unobservables that may be correlated with pension receipt status and outcomes. λt, year fixed effects, are also included. We use standard errors clustered at the individual level.

A key identifying assumption when using the difference-in-differences strategy is the parallel trend assumption. This assumption posits that in the absence of any policy intervention, the trends in outcome variables for both the treatment and control groups would have evolved similarly over time. To test this assumption, we conduct an event study style analysis. These results are presented in Appendix Figure A1.8 All outcome variables satisfy the parallel trends assumption. The treatment and control groups exhibited no statistically significant pre-reform differences that could confound post-reform trends, lending credibility to our analysis.

The literature suggests that responses to cash transfers vary by socioeconomic status (Barrientos, 2003; Fetter and Lockwood, 2018; Kaushal, 2014; Koh and Yang, 2021). Given that the target of the Basic Pension was the bottom 70% of the elderly, the marginal benefits and subsequent behavioral responses may differ depending on the economic circumstances of each individual. To examine such heterogeneity, we use education level as a proxy for individuals’ economic circumstances. We estimate a triple-difference (DDD) model that takes advantage of the variation in educational attainment among the elderly. Specifically, we define individuals whose highest level of education is middle school or below as the low-education group and examine whether their labor market responses and consumption behaviors display heterogeneity. We estimate the following regression:

This model builds on the baseline difference-in-differences specification by incorporating a triple-interaction term that captures variation by education level. The key coefficient of interest, β7, captures the differential treatment effect for individuals with lower levels of education. All regressions include individual fixed effects (θi), time fixed effects (λt), and the same set of covariates Xit included in the DD specification.

V. Analysis and Discussion

A. Consumption

We begin by examining the impact of the Basic Pension on household consumption, measured by household expenditure. Table 3 reports the estimated effects on consumption behavior. Consistent with its aim to enhance the financial stability of older adults, the pension reform led to a statistically significant increase in household expenditure levels at the 10 percent level (column 1). The full-sample estimate suggests an increase of approximately 12,087 KRW following the near doubling of the pension transfer—from 99,100 KRW (US$68) to 200,000 KRW (US$138) as a result of the reform. Despite the near doubling of pension benefits, household expenditure increased by only about 12% of the additional pension income, indicating that the consumption response was relatively limited. As prior research suggests that a recipient’s gender affects resource allocation, 9 we also examine the effect separately by gender. The coefficient estimates for males (column 2) and females (column 3) are both positive and comparable in magnitude to the full-sample estimate, though statistical significance is no longer maintained. The results remain insignificant for the log of consumption (columns 4–6). This relatively modest consumption response is consistent with the evidence in Appendix Table A1 showing that public transfers partially crowded out private ones.

TABLE 3
EFFECTS OF THE BASIC PENSION REFORM ON HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE
jep-48-3-25-t003.tif

Note: Individual fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

To further investigate, we restrict the sample to individuals aged 58–71 (Appendix Table A2). In this narrower window, we find a stronger and more pronounced increase in expenditure. This suggests that our baseline full-sample results provide a conservative estimate of the reform’s impact, as the consumption response appears concentrated among those closer to the eligibility threshold.

While we treat 2014 as the pre-reform year given that the survey data were collected in the first half of the year, the announced reform may have induced anticipatory behavioral responses prior to its implementation in July of that year. Such anticipation could lead to an underestimation of the true effect. To address this concern, we re-estimate the main specification while excluding the year 2014 for robustness. These results, reported in Appendix Table A3, are consistent with the findings of the main sample.

B. Labor Supply

Next, we explore the effect of the Basic Pension reform on elderly labor market outcomes. Table 4 shows that the increase in benefits from the Basic Pension reform had no impact on overall labor force participation (column 1) or the likelihood of employment (column 2). These findings suggest that pension eligibility does not lead to substantial labor market withdrawal among the elderly at the extensive margin or create significant labor disincentives. This result is consistent with prior findings using South Korean data showing no significant impact of the Basic Pension (Jin, 2023) or the Basic Old-Age Pension (Koh and Yang, 2021) on overall employment rates.10 We also find that the modest increase in pension benefits has no effect on the likelihood of self-employment among employed individuals (column 3), where self-employment serves as a proxy for low-quality jobs compared to wage employment. On the other hand, in column 4, the coefficient on the interaction term for full-time employment (among wage workers) is negative and significant. The estimated treatment effect indicates that individuals in the treatment group are 9 percentage points less likely to work full-time, relative to the baseline mean of 0.73 for the treatment group (a decline of approximately 12 percent from the mean). This is reflected in the impact of the basic pension reducing work hours by approximately three hours per week among those who are employed in column 5 of Table 4.11

TABLE 4
EFFECTS OF THE BASIC PENSION REFORM ON LABOR SUPPLY
jep-48-3-25-t004.tif

Note: Individual fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

We also present the results from the subgroup analysis by gender in Table 5, which are broadly consistent with the full-sample findings. The pension reform shows no significant impact on labor force participation (column 1), employment likelihood (column 2), or the likelihood of self-employment (column 3) for either males or females. However, the male and female subsamples both exhibit declines in work intensity levels. Among those affected by the reform, males are 9.1 percentage points less likely to be employed full time, while females show a larger decline of 7.6 percentage points (column 4). Lastly, the reform reduced weekly working hours among the employed by 2.96 hours for men (column 5), though the reduction of 1.1 hours for women is not statistically significant. These findings suggest that the Basic Pension reform may have contributed to reduced work intensity, potentially reflecting a reduced financial need to remain in more demanding or time-intensive jobs.

TABLE 5
EFFECTS OF THE BASIC PENSION REFORM ON LABOR SUPPLY BY GENDER
jep-48-3-25-t005.tif

Note: Individual fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Although increases in unearned income typically discourage the supply of labor (Imbens et al., 2001), we find limited effects, with responses primarily at the intensive margin. The modest consumption response suggests that the (perceived) net financial gains were not substantial enough to induce significant changes in the labor supply, particularly for those whose incomes were low enough to be eligible for the transfer. It should also be noted that in 2013, prior to the reform, only 36.65% of individuals aged 65–74 in the treatment group were employed. This relatively low baseline employment rate implies more limited room for labor supply adjustments compared to younger age groups with higher employment levels.

We show that our results are robust to several sensitivity checks. Given that the difference-in-differences approach relies on the control group being a valid counterfactual relative to the treated group, we restrict the sample to a narrower age range of elderly individuals aged 58-71. In this case, the control group includes individuals aged 58-64, while the treatment group comprises those aged 65-71. As shown in Appendix Table A4, the estimated effects remain consistent with our main results. Although no confounding events coincided with the pension reform, we further test the robustness of our results by estimating the models over a shorter sample period. These results are presented in Figure A2. The results remain consistent across the 2009-2018, 2010-2017, and 2011-2016 windows, suggesting that our findings are not sensitive to the choice of sample period.12 In the male and female subsample analysis, statistical significance tends to diminish with a shorter sample period, but the direction of the effects remains consistent.

C. Heterogeneity Analysis by Education Level

The Basic Pension reform was designed to target economically disadvantaged elderly individuals. It is therefore likely that the impact would vary by the socioeconomic status of the recipients as found in previous studies (Baird et al., 2018; Barrientos, 2003; Fetter and Lockwood, 2018; Kaushal, 2014). We use educational attainment as a proxy for socioeconomic status. Within the treatment group (ages 65–74) in our analysis sample, 69% of individuals have a middle school education or less (see Table 2).

On average individuals with middle school education or less, have lower household expenditure, less likely to be a homeowner, and are also less likely to own a car, suggesting that education level is a suitable proxy for socioeconomic status in Appendix Table A6. Specifically, household expenditure is substantially higher for the higher-educated group (3,344,000 KRW (US$2,307)) compared to the lower educated group (2,091,100 KRW (US$1,443)). There also seem to be differences in gender composition in that 34% of individuals with a middle school education or less are male, whereas 71% of those with more than a middle school education are male.

Table 6 presents the results from the triple-difference estimation of Equation (2). For the full sample (Panel A), the estimated effects on consumption outcomes are statistically insignificant in both levels and logarithmic terms (columns 1–2), indicating no significant heterogeneity in the consumption response by education level. In contrast, labor market outcomes display heterogeneity. The reform led to a reduction in labor force participation and employment among the low-educated relative to their higher-educated counterparts, as indicated by the statistically significant estimates in columns 3 and 4. However, no such differential impact is observed among the employed, where estimates for self-employment, full-time status, and weekly working hours remain statistically insignificant (columns 5–7).

TABLE 6
EFFECTS OF THE BASIC PENSION REFORM ON LABOR SUPPLY AND CONSUMPTION BY GENDER
jep-48-3-25-t006.tif

Note: Individual fixed effects, year fixed effects and control variables are included in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Next, we examine gender-specific effects in Panels B and C. For males (Panel B), the triple interaction coefficients show no statistically significant effects on either household consumption or labor market outcomes. While these estimates are directionally consistent with the findings for women, their lack of statistical significance makes it difficult to distinguish whether the responses among men truly do not vary by education level or if the analysis lacks the statistical power to detect such differences within the smaller male subsample. For females (Panel C), the estimates similarly indicate no differential effects by education on consumption outcomes (columns 1–2). For labor market outcomes, however, we find significant heterogeneity by education at the extensive margin. Specifically, relative to their higher-educated counterparts, low-educated women experienced a 15.9 percentage point larger decline in labor force participation and a 15.7 percentage point larger decline in employment (columns 3–4). No differential effects by education are observed for self-employment, full-time status and work hours.

D. Heterogeneity by Income Group

While educational attainment serves as a proxy for long-term socioeconomic status, it may not fully capture a household’s current financial circumstances. To more directly assess the role of economic vulnerability and potential liquidity constraints, we examine heterogeneity by income group. We define ‘low-income’ households as those with earnings below 60 percent of the median household income12 and re-estimate the main specification for these subgroups. This approach allows us to examine whether the reform’s impact is concentrated among households that face binding liquidity constraints and may thus respond differently to the increase in pension income.

Table 7 presents the results of the heterogeneity analysis by income group. In column 1, while non-low-income households exhibit a significant increase in household expenditure (Panel A), low-income households show no such response (Panel B). Regarding labor supply, neither income group exhibits significant effects at the extensive margin (columns 3–4). However, we observe distinct patterns of adjustment in work intensity. Among non-low-income households, the reform led to a significant reduction in both the likelihood of full-time employment and total weekly working hours (columns 6–7), particularly for men. While the estimates for women in the same income bracket are not statistically significant, the coefficients carry the same signs and show comparable magnitudes, suggesting a consistent directional response. In contrast, for low-income households, full-time work status remains unaffected, and the reduction in labor supply is limited to a smaller decline in working hours observed only among men (column 7). These results suggest that while a reduction in work intensity is present across the sample, the ability to transition out of full-time employment is concentrated among elderly with higher current incomes.

TABLE 7
EFFECTS OF THE BASIC PENSION REFORM ON LABOR SUPPLY AND CONSUMPTION BY GENDER
jep-48-3-25-t007.tif

Note: Each cell represents the estimated coefficient of the interaction term (Treat × Post) from separate regressions. All models include individual fixed effects, year fixed effects, and control variables. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

VI. Conclusion

Using a difference-in-differences approach with data from the Korea Welfare Panel Study (KoWePS), this study examines the effects of South Korea’s 2014 Basic Pension reform on consumption and labor supply among the elderly. We find that while the expansion of public transfers was partially offset by a decline in private transfers, the reform still generated a modest but statistically significant increase in household expenditure, equivalent to roughly 12 percent of the benefit hike. Turning to labor supply outcomes, we find no significant effect on labor force participation or employment. Instead, we find evidence that the reform reduced work intensity, with significant declines in full-time employment and weekly working hours among the employed.

These average effects, however, mask important heterogeneity across socioeconomic groups. Using educational attainment as a proxy, we find that the labor supply responses among men were statistically indistinguishable across education levels. In contrast, low-educated women experienced significantly larger reductions in labor force participation and employment relative to their higher-educated counterparts, suggesting that the extensive-margin response was concentrated among the most socioeconomically vulnerable women. Further heterogeneity by income group reveals important differences in how households adjusted consumption and labor supply behavior. Among non-low-income households, the reform generated a significant increase in household expenditure and reductions in full-time employment and working hours among the employed, particularly among men. Among low-income households, in contrast, we find little evidence of changes in either consumption or labor supply, aside from a reduction in working hours among men.

Taken together, these findings suggest that the Basic Pension provided meaningful income relief for some older adults with sufficient economic flexibility to reduce their labor supply, while remaining insufficient to enable a broader withdrawal from work among elderly individuals facing persistent economic hardship. More broadly, our results highlight that even a near-universal pension expansion can generate highly uneven behavioral responses across socioeconomic groups, underscoring the importance of considering heterogeneity when evaluating the welfare and labor market effects of old-age income-support programs.

Appendices

APPENDIX

A. Recognized Income Formula for Basic Pension Eligibility

The recognized income formula is central to assessing eligibility for the Basic Pension. This formula combines both a monthly income evaluation and converted monthly asset income to provide a comprehensive measure of an applicant’s financial standing. The monthly income evaluation is calculated as follows:

This calculation incorporates diverse income sources, including business income, property income, and public transfer payments, as well as imputed income from free lodging. The converted monthly asset income further adjusts for assets such as general property, financial savings, and luxury items, with the basic deduction for general property varying across metropolitan areas, small and medium-sized cities, and urban/rural areas. The annual conversion rate is 4%. By integrating both income and asset evaluations, the formula ensures a fair and equitable assessment of financial need.

B. Tables and Figures

FIGURE A1.
PARALLEL TREND ASSUMPTION
jep-48-3-25-f003.tif
TABLE A1
EFFECTS OF THE BASIC PENSION REFORM ON PRIVATE TRANSFERS
jep-48-3-25-t008.tif

Note: The dependent variable is the natural log of private transfers received. Individual fixed effects, year fixed effects and control variables are included in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

TABLE A2
EFFECTS OF THE BASIC PENSION REFORM ON HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE (AGE 58–71)
jep-48-3-25-t009.tif

Note: Individual fixed effects, year fixed effects and control variables are included in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

TABLE A3
EFFECTS OF THE BASIC PENSION REFORM ON HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE (EXCLUDING 2014)
jep-48-3-25-t010.tif

Note: Individual fixed effects, year fixed effects and control variables are included in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

TABLE A4
EFFECTS OF THE BASIC PENSION REFORM ON LABOR SUPPLY (AGE 58–71)
jep-48-3-25-t011.tif

Note: Individual fixed effects, year fixed effects and control variables are included in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

TABLE A5
EFFECTS OF THE BASIC PENSION REFORM ON LABOR SUPPLY (EXCLUDING 2014)
jep-48-3-25-t012.tif

Note: Individual fixed effects, year fixed effects and control variables are included in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

TABLE A6
SUMMARY STATISTICS AMONG TREATMENT GROUP BY EDUCATION ATTAINMENT
jep-48-3-25-t013.tif

Note: 1) Only wage workers were asked about their full-time status; 2) Metropolitan region refers to the Seoul Metropolitan Area (Seoul, Incheon, and Gyeonggi-do); 3) All expenditures are presented as 10,000 KRW (US$7).

FIGURE A2.
EFFECTS OF THE BASIC PENSION REFORM ON CONSUMPTION AND LABOR SUPPLY: DIFFERENT PERIODS
jep-48-3-25-f004.tif

Note: This figure plots estimated treatment effects of the Basic Pension reform across three different sample periods (2009-2018, 2010-2017, 2011-2016). Each panel shows point estimates and 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. Outcomes include household expenditure, the log value of household expenditure, labor force participation, employment, self-employment, full-time work, and weekly work hours. Circle, square, and triangle markers correspond to the respective sample periods.

Notes

[†] Supported by

Hyelim Son gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2022S1A5A8053860). All errors are our own.

[1]

According to the World Health Organization, the number of people aged 60 or older is projected to increase by more than twofold, from 1 billion in 2020 to 2.1 billion by 2050 (WHO, 2024).

[2]

For example, Banerjee et al. (2017) examine six government-administered cash transfer programs across developing countries and find a limited effect on employment or hours worked. They suggest that transfer amounts are typically too small, requiring recipients to continue working to meet basic needs. On the other hand, Fetter and Lockwood (2018) find that the introduction of old-age assistance significantly reduced the labor supply among the elderly in the U.S. These differences highlight the role of pension system design and generosity in shaping labor market responses.

[3]

Koh and Yang (2021) document the perfect crowding out of private transfers, implying limited net income and consumption gains. Similarly, Ku et al. (2024) find reduced income poverty but no significant change in consumption poverty from the introduction of Korea’s Basic Pension.

[4]

Calculated by dividing the average monthly Basic Pension benefit for a single-recipient household by the average monthly household current income using 2014 data.

[5]

US$1 is equal to 1,449 KRW as of February 7, 2025.

[6]

Recognized income is a comprehensive measure that includes both actual income and imputed income from assets. A detailed explanation of its calculation is provided in Appendix A.

[7]

For clarity, we refer to the maximum cash transfer under the Basic Pension system as the ‘maximum pension amount,’ although official government documents use the term ‘Standard Pension Amount.’

[8]

The pre-reform waves are 2009–2014, with 2014 omitted.

[9]

For instance, research has shown that the gender of the pension recipient influences how the income is spent. Duflo (2003) shows that grandmothers in South Africa tend to invest more in girls as their pension income increases, while Qian (2008) finds that increased income among adult females positively affects girls’ survival rates, whereas male income has the opposite effect in China.

[10]

This stands in contrast to a large body of evidence from other countries indicating that old-age pension programs reduce the labor supply among the elderly. See, for example, one study in the context of South Africa (Ranchhod, 2006) and other in the context of India (Kaushal, 2014; Unnikrishnan and Imai, 2020).

[11]

While our findings indicate that the Basic Pension reduces work hours, a previous study of the Basic Old-Age Pension reports no such effect (Koh and Yang, 2021). This difference may be attributable to the relatively small benefit amount at the initial introduction of the program and to the near-complete crowding out of private transfers observed at the time, given that it was the first instance of a non-contributory old age pension provision. This pattern is consistent with work by Ranchhod (2006), which examined the impact of the South African old age pension.

[12]

We also conduct a robustness check on labor supply outcomes by excluding the year 2014, which is the year of the reform. These results are reported in Appendix Table A5. The pattern of statistical significance remains consistent with the main findings. No significant effects are found at the extensive margin across all subgroups. At the intensive margin, the estimated coefficients are larger in magnitude, particularly for full-time work status and weekly working hours. For instance, the reduction in working hours among older men increases from 2.96 to 4.02 hours per week. These results suggest that the main estimates are conservative while also confirming that our results are robust to the exclusion of the 2014 observations.

[12]

This classification follows the KoWePS sampling design, which uses 60% of the median as the threshold to distinguish low-income from non-low-income cases.

References

1 

Baird, Sarah, McKenzie, David, & Özler, Berk. (2018). The Effects of Cash Transfers on Adult Labor Market Outcomes. IZA Journal of Development and Migration, 8, 1-20.

2 

Banerjee, Abhijit V., Hanna, Rema, Kreindler, Gabriel E., & Olken, Benjamin A. (2017). Debunking the Stereotype of the Lazy Welfare Recipient: Evidence from Cash Transfer Programs. The World Bank Research Observer, 32(2), 155-184, https://doi.org/10.1093/wbro/lkx002.

3 

Barrientos, Armando. What is the Impact of Non-contributory Pensions on Poverty? Estimates from Brazil and South Africa, 2003, Estimates from Brazil and South Africa.

4 

Blau, David M., & Robins, Philip K. (1986). Labor Supply Response to Welfare Programs: A Dynamic Analysis. Journal of Labor Economics, 4(1), 82-104, https://doi.org/10.1086/298095.

5 

Bloom, David E., Canning, David, & Lubet, Alyssa. (2015). Global Population Aging: Facts, Challenges, Solutions & Perspectives. Daedalus, 144(2), 80-92, https://doi.org/10.1162/DAED_a_00332.

6 

Blundell, Richard, & MaCurdy, Thomas. (1999). Handbook of Labor Economics (Vol. 3). pp. 1559-1695, Labor Supply: A Review of Alternative Approaches, https://doi.org/10.1016/S1573-4463(99)03008-4.

7 

Chen, Xi. (2017). Old Age Pension and Intergenerational Living Arrangements: A Regression Discontinuity Design. Review of Economics of the Household, 15(2), 455-476, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11150-015-9304-y.

8 

Duflo, Esther. (2003). Grandmothers and Granddaughters: Old-age Pensions and Intrahousehold Allocation in South Africa. The World Bank Economic Review, 17(1), 1-25, https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhg013.

9 

Fan, Elliott. (2010). Who Benefits from Public Old Age Pensions? Evidence from a Targeted Program. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 58(2), 297-322, https://doi.org/10.1086/647977.

10 

Fetter, Daniel K., & Lee, M. Lockwood. (2018). Government Old-age Support and Labor Supply: Evidence from the Old Age Assistance Program. American Economic Review, 108(8), 2174-2211, https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20160921.

11 

Imbens, Guido W., Rubin, Donald B., & Sacerdote, Bruce I. (2001). Estimating the Effect of Unearned Income on Labor Earnings, Savings, and Consumption: Evidence from a Survey of Lottery Players. American Economic Review, 91(4), 778-794, https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.4.778.

12 

Jin, Seongjin. (2023). The Effect of a Change to the Income Support Policy for the Elderly on Labor Supply in South Korea. Economic Analysis and Policy, 79, 497-524, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eap.2023.06.009.

13 

Kang, Ji Young, Park, Sojung, & Ahn, Seoyeon. (2022). The Effect of Social Pension on Consumption among Older Adults in Korea. The Journal of the Economics of Ageing, 100364.

14 

Kaushal, Neeraj. (2014). How Public Pension Affects Elderly Labor Supply and Well-being: Evidence from India. World Development, 56, 214-225, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.10.029.

15 

Kim, Hak Hyo, & Kim, Hong Kyun. (2021). The Effect of the Increase in the Basic Pension Amount on Labor Market Participation of Older People. Korean Journal of Public Finance, 14(1), 63-89, in Korean.

16 

Kim, Jaeho, & Jung, Jooyeon. (2012). The Analysis of the Inequality and the Polarization of the Basic Old-Age Pension System. Korean Policy Studies Review, 21(1), 421-446, in Korean.

17 

Kim, Yun-young, Park, Jung Ji, & Kim, Soohyun. (2022). A Study on the Effect of Korean Basic Pension on the Labor Supply of Elderly People, Gyeonggi Research Institute Review, 1-127, in Korean.

18 

Koh, Kanghyock, & Yang, Hyunjoo. (2021). Social Insurance in an Aging Population: Impacts of a Government Transfer Program in South Korea. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 69(4), 1301-1322, https://doi.org/10.1086/705021.

19 

Ku, Inhoe, Kim, Soohyun, & Yoon, Halim. (2024). Small Cash Transfers to Older People: Do They Reduce Poverty? Ageing & Society, 1-19.

20 

Lee, Jinkook. (2020). Study on Self-employment and Policy Suggestions, Research Monograph 2020-06, Korea Development Institute, in Korean.

21 

Lee, Juhyun, Lee, Daewoong, & Kwon, Kiheon. (2018). Analysis of the Policy Effects of Basic Pension System: Centered on Household Equivalized Expenditure & Income. Korean Journal of Policy Analysis and Evaluation, 28(3), 75-105, in Korean, https://doi.org/10.23036/KAPAE.2018.28.3.004.

22 

Lee, Kang Gu, & Shin, Seung Ryong. (2024, February). Korea’s National Pension: Structural Reform Measures, KDI Focus No. 129, Korea Development Institute (KDI), in Korean.

23 

Ministry of Government Legislation. Ministry of Government Legislation, National Pension Act, Korean Law Information Center, 2024, in Korean.

24 

Ministry of Health and Welfare. Ministry of Health and Welfare, Statistics on the Basic Old-Age Pension in 2014, 2015a, in Korean.

25 

Ministry of Health and Welfare. Ministry of Health and Welfare, Statistics on the Basic Pension in 2014, 2015b, in Korean.

26 

Moffitt, Robert A. (2002). Handbook of Public Economics (Vol. 4). pp. 2393-2430, Welfare programs and labor supply, https://doi.org/10.1016/S1573-4420(02)80013-1.

27 

National Pension Service. National Pension Service, National Pension Scheme Overview, 2025, https://www.nps.or.kr/pnsinfo/ntpsklg/getOHAF0003M0.do, in Korean, accessed on May 24, 2025.

28 

OECD. OECD, Poverty rate (66 year-olds or more, % of population, 2022), 2022, https://www.oecd. org/en/data/indicators/poverty-rate.html?oecdcontrol-8027380c62-var3=2022&oecdcontrol-9f300511bc-var6=Y_GT65, accessed on January 30, 2025.

29 

Park, Seung Jun, Lee, Da Hoon, & Gwak, Dam Won. (2024). Analysis of the Effects of Basic Pension Increases on Labor Supply and Private Transfers among the Elderly Using a Panel SUR Model. Korean Journal of Public Finance, 17(4), 141-179, in Korean.

30 

Qian, Nancy. (2008). Missing Women and the Price of Tea in China: The Effect of Sex-specific Earnings on Sex Imbalance. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(3), 1251-1285, https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2008.123.3.1251.

31 

Ranchhod, Vimal. (2006). The Effect of the South African Old Age Pension on Labour Supply of the Elderly. South African Journal of Economics, 74(4), 725-744, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1813-6982.2006.00098.x.

32 

Sung, Hyo-Yong, & Lee, Kyunggon. (2018). The Effect of Basic Pension on Labor Supply. The Journal of Korean Public Policy, 20(4), 83-108, in Korean, https://doi.org/10.37103/KAPP.20.4.4.

33 

The Lancet Regional Health-Western Pacific. (2023). The Lancet Regional Health: Western Pacific. pp. 36, South Korea’s Population Shift: Challenges and Opportunities, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lanwpc.2023.100865.

34 

Unnikrishnan, Vidhya, & Imai, Katsushi S. (2020). Does the Old-age Pension Scheme Improve Household Welfare? Evidence from India. World Development, 134, 105017, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105017.

35 

WHO. WHO, Ageing and Health, 2024, https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/ageing-and-health, accessed on January 30, 2025.

36 

Wilmoth, John Richard, Bas, Daniela, Mukherjee, Santanu, & Hanif, Naveed. (2023). World social report 2023: Leaving no one behind in an ageing world, UN.

37 

World Bank. World Bank, Population Ages 65 and Above (% of total population), World Bank Open Data, 2024, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.65UP.TO.ZS, Accessed July 12, 2025.

LITERATURE IN KOREAN

38 

김학효 & 김홍균. (2021). 기초연금 기준연금액 인상이 고령층 노동시장 참여에 미치는 영향 분석. 재정학연구, 14(1), 63-89.

39 

김재호 & 정주연. (2012). 기초노령연금 도입에 따른 소득불평등과 양극화 변화분석. 한국정책학회보, 21(1), 421-446.

40 

김윤영, 박정지, & 김수현. (2022). 기초연금이 노인 노동공급에 미치는 영향 분석, 경기연구원 기본연구, 1-127.

41 

이진국. (2020). 자영업에 대한 종합적 분석과 정책제언, 연구보고서 2020-06, 한국개발연구원.

42 

이주현, 이대웅, & 권기헌. (2018). 기초연금제도의 정책 효과 분석: 가구균등화 소비지출 및 소득을 중심으로. 정책분석평가학회보, 28(3), 75-105, https://doi.org/10.23036/KAPAE.2018.28.3.004.

43 

이강구 & 신승룡. (2024). 국민연금 구조개혁 방안. KDI FOCUS [129], 한국개발연구원.

44 

법제처. 법제처, 국민연금법, 국가법령정보센터, 2024.

45 

보건복지부. (2015a). 통계로 본 2014년 기초노령연금.

46 

보건복지부. (2015b). 통계로 본 2014년 기초연금.

47 

국민연금공단. 국민연금공단, 국민연금의 도입과 발전, 국민연금공단 홈페이지, 2025.

48 

박승준, 이다훈, & 곽담원. (2024). 패널 SUR 모형을 이용한 기초연금액 인상이 고령층의 노동공급 및 사적이전소득에 미치는 영향 분석. 재정학연구, 17(4), 141-179.

49 

성효용 & 이경곤. (2018). 기초연금의 노동공급 효과. 재정정책논집, 20(4), 83-108.