Journal Archive

Home > Journal Archive
Cover Image
  • P-ISSN 2586-2995
  • E-ISSN 2586-4130
Cite

KDI Journal of Economic Policy. Vol. 38, No. 2, May 2016, pp. 87-101

https://doi.org/10.23895/kdijep.2016.38.2.87

× KDI Open Access is a program of fully open access journals to facilitate the widest possible dissemination of high-quality research. All research articles published in KDI JEP are immediately, permanently and freely available online for everyone to read, download and share in terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

A Signaling Theory of Education under the Presence of Career Concerns

SUN JOO HWANG

Author & Article History

Manuscript received 09 July 2015; revision received 16 July 2015; accepted 28 March 2016.

Abstract

A person’s life consists of two important stages: the first stage as a student and the second stage as a worker. In an integrated model of education and career concerns, I analyze the welfare effects of education. In Spence’s job market signaling model, education as a sorting device improves efficiency by mitigating the lemon market problem. In contrast, in the integrated model, education as a sorting device can be detrimental to social welfare, as it eliminates work incentives generated by career concerns.

Keywords

education, signaling, career concerns

JEL Code

D86, G38

상단으로 이동

KDIJEP