- P-ISSN 1738-656X
Journal Archive
Home > Journal Archive
한국개발연구. Vol. 35, No. 3, September 2013, pp. 91-124
https://doi.org/10.23895/kdijep.2013.35.3.91
×
KDI Open Access is a program of fully open access journals to facilitate
the widest possible dissemination of high-quality research.
All research articles published in KDI JEP are immediately,
permanently and freely available online for everyone to read,
download and share in terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Defending Multiple Terrorist Targets
Abstract
This paper analyzes a situation where multiple targets are exposed to a potential terrorist attack. The probability of an attack is determined endogenously in a game where a terrorist chooses the target while the targets independently determine the level of deterrence. As each target tries to divert an attack to others, the symmetric equilibrium becomes suboptimal and exhibits dispersion in the level of deterrence. The analysis shows that the first best deterrence level may be achieved when the targets can write a binding risk-sharing contract. Such a contract has limited applicability however as it suffers from a potential verification problem.
Keywords
Terrorism(테러리즘), Counterterrorism(대테러), Contract(계약)
JEL Code
D74, H56
- 938Download
- 6295Viewed
Other articles from this issue
Recommended Articles
