This study examines whether the executive turnover and the executive resignation during the term of office affect the performance of Korean state-owned enterprises. The executive turnover in the paper means the comprehensive change of the executives which includes the change after the term of office, the change after consecutive terms and the change during the term of office. The ‘resignation’ was named for the executive change during the term of office to distinguish from the executive turnover. The study scope of the paper is restrained to the comprehensive executive change itself irrespective of the term of office and the resignation during the term of office. Therefore the natural change of the executive after the term of office or the change after consecutive terms is not included in the study. Spontaneous resignation and forced resignation are not distinguished in the paper as the distinction between the two is not easy. The paper uses both the margin of return on asset and the margin of return on asset adjusted by industry as proxies of the performance of state-owned enterprises. The business nature of state-owned enterprise is considered in the study, the public nature not in it. The paper uses the five year (2004 to 2008) samples of 24 firms designated as public enterprises by Korean government. The analysis results are as follows. First, 45.1% of CEOs were changed a year during the sample period on the average. The average tenure period of CEOs was 2 years and 3 months and 49.9% among the changed CEOs resigned during the term of office. 41.6% of internal auditors were changed a year on the average. The average tenure period of internal auditors was 2 years and 2 months and 51.0% among the changed internal auditors resigned during the term of office. In case of outside directors, on average, 38.2% were changed a year. The average tenure period was 2 years and 7 months and 25.4% among the changed internal directors resigned during the term of office. These statistics show that numerous CEOs resigned before the finish of the three year term in office. Also, considering the tenure of an internal auditor and an outside director which diminished from 3 years to 2 years by an Act on the Management of Public Institutions (applied to the executives appointed since April 2007), it seems most internal auditors resigned during the term of office but most outside directors resigned after the end of the term. Secondly, There was no evidence that the executives were changed during the term of office because of the bad performance of prior year. On the other hand, contrary to the normal expectation, the performance of prior year of the state-owned enterprise where an outside director resigned during the term of office was significantly higher than that of other state-owned enterprises. It means that the clauses in related laws on the executive dismissal on grounds of bad performance did not work normally. Instead it can be said that the executive change was made by non-economic reasons such as a political motivation. Thirdly, the results from a fixed effect model show there were evidences that performance turned negatively when CEOs or outside directors resigned during the term of office. CEO’s resignation during the term of office gave a significantly negative effect on the margin of return on asset. Outside director’s resignation during the term of office lowered significantly the margin of return on asset adjusted by industry. These results suggest that the executive’s change in Korean state-owned enterprises was not made by objective or economic standards such as management performance assessment and the negative effect on performance of the enterprises was had by the unfaithful obeyance of the legal executive term.