- P-ISSN 1738-656X
한국개발연구. Vol. 34, No. 2, June 2012, pp. 173-204
https://doi.org/10.23895/kdijep.2012.34.2.173
This study examines the equilibrium investment on the pollution abatement when firms are facing Cournot competition in the output market while the pollution permit market is perfectly competitive. Unlike standard perfect competition scenario, the abatement investment delivers an indirect effect in which it reduces other firms' equilibrium output. Consequently, compared with the socially optimal level, overinvestment arises. I also overview the potential inefficiencies that imperfect market structure induces under the emission trading scheme, presenting policy implications.
배출권 거래제도(Emission Trading Scheme), 저감투자(Abatement Investment), 쿠르노 경쟁(Cournot Competition)
D43, L13, Q53, Q55