KDI Journal of Economic Policy

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P-ISSN 1738-656X

Vol.33, No.3

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한국개발연구. Vol. 33, No. 3, October 2011, pp. 121-161

https://doi.org/10.23895/kdijep.2011.33.3.121

× KDI Open Access is a program of fully open access journals to facilitate the widest possible dissemination of high-quality research. All research articles published in KDI JEP are immediately, permanently and freely available online for everyone to read, download and share in terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Incentive Structures in the Compensation for Public Expropriation

Ho jun Lee

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Abstract

We study incentive structures of public developers and land owners in the process of public expropriations using a sequential game model. In the model, we show that there is an incentive for the public developer to give more compensation than just compensation that are defined by law. Also the model shows that there is an incentive for the land owners to revolt strategically against the public expropriation. Then an ideal authority delegation model is introduced to resolve the problems, where an independent appraiser determines the compensation for the expropriation. In the real world, improving the independence of appraisal process is critical to make the system closer to the ideal authority delegation model. So this paper concludes by making a few policy suggestions to improve the current appraisal system.

Keywords

공공수용(Public Expropriation), 정당보상(Just Compensation), 권한위임(Authority Delegation), 감정평가(Appraisal)

JEL Code

K11, C78, D82, R14

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