As the ‘jobless growth’ is developing into a worldwide phenomenon, many countries try to recover a virtuous relationship between the growth and employment using various wage subsidy programs. This study focuses on wage subsidy to employers, labor demand-side wage subsidy for which one can think of two types－a tax credit(a flat wage subsidy) and a social insurance premium exemption(a proportional wage subsidy). For job creation, Korean government reintroduced a tax credit to small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs) which have increased their employment level in 2010. But many experts has continuously insisted that it should be replaced with a social insurance premium exemption arguing only a few SMEs benefit from the tax credit as most of them are actually not paying any corporate or general income tax bills. However, as the insurance premium exemption accompanies an increase in the amount of budget with the coverage widen, one cannot confirm its cost effectiveness over the tax credit. This paper aims to provide a theoretical analysis to derive some formal conditions under which a social insurance premium exemption creates more jobs than a tax credit does given a budget constraint. We show that the former’s dominance over the latter depends on whether there exists a dead zone of social insurance or not. If there does not exist a dead zone, a social insurance premium exemption is more desirable in many cases, whereas one cannot guarantees its dominance over a tax credit if there exists a dead zone. Therefore in order to realize its dominance, the government should minimize a dead zone so that most SMEs effectively benefit from the insurance premium exemption. In addition, applying discriminative exemption rates which reflect each firm’s job conditions such as wage level and labor demand/supply sensitivity, the government try to enhance job creation effect.