This paper examines the redistributive potential of capital taxations within the two class overlapping generations model, where only capitalists are intergenerationally linked through heritable capital stocks. In particular, the dynamic welfare incidence of two different capital taxations is examined; first a capital income tax levied uniformly on interest earnings, and second, an estate tax levied on the intergenerational transfers of capital stock within the capitalists’ families. Redistributive effects are measured by examining how the permanent and unanticipated changes in proportional capital income tax and estate tax rates affect workers' welfare when the proceeds in each period are distributed, in a lump-sum fashion, among young workers. It is shown that, except for in the short run, both the capital taxes are ineffective and may actually lower the workers' steady state welfare through the shifting of tax burden toward workers from capitalists. Differential incidence analysis shows that redistributive potential is diminished further when the lump-sum transfers are financed by the estate tax rather than by the capital income tax. Although the model examined in this paper is based on simple and strong assumptions, this study suggests that redistributive policy using the capital taxations may only have distortionary effects in the long run, without improving workers' welfare, by incurring dead-weight loss unless additional fiscal measures are implemented to increase the investment incentives.