This paper studies implications of financial conglomeration for both financial risk of individual conglomerates and systemic risk potential in post-crisis Korea. Our analyses suggest that we cannot conclude that financial conglomerates are taking on higher risks relative to non-conglomerate independent institutions. We also find that larger financial institutions show a significantly higher profitability and lower variability in profitability operating on a superior efficient frontier. However, it turns out that the consolidation has raised systemic risk potential as direct and indirect interdependencies among large banking institutions have substantially increased. Furthermore, financial conglomerates have become more vulnerable to contagion risks from non-bank sectors and capital markets. In the face of the shifting risk structure, financial supervisory and regulatory systems must be upgraded toward a more risk-based, consolidated supervision. Prompt corrective action provision for financial conglomerates must be based upon fully consolidated group risks, and effective supervisory devices need to be introduced to avoid inadvertent extension of public safety net to cross-sectoral activities of financial conglomerates. It is also critical to strengthen internal control and risk management capacities at financial conglomerates, and to establish strong market discipline by improving information transparency and monitoring incentives in the financial market.